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FOREKNOWLEDGE AND NECESSITY 
William Hasker 
The modem controversy over divine foreknowledge and human freedom, begun 
two decades ago by Nelson Pike and A. N. Prior, I has yet to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion. Probably most philosophers who have considered the issue have 
reached their own conclusions, but no sort of general consensus has emerged. 
Furthermore, the principal arguments of the opposing sides in the controversy 
seem to pass by each other almost without contact, so that there is much discus-
sion, but little apparent progress. 
It is not immediately obvious why this should be so. There do not appear to 
be any systematic differences in philosophical style or methodology between the 
opposing sides which might explain their differing conclusions. Nor does the 
issue seem to be one which marks the difference between major competing 
world-views-like, for example, the controversies over scientific determinism 
or mind-body dualism. To be sure, the role of religious belief in the controversy 
cannot be denied, but it would be premature to explain the philosophical disa-
greements solel·y in terms of prior religious commitments. 
While the issues surrounding the disagreement are complex, it will be argued 
here that what lies at the root of them is disagreement over a fundamental intuition 
or metaphysical datum-the intuition often expressed by saying, "You can't 
change the past." Perhaps no one involved in the controversy denies this outright, 
but there are wide differences about what its significance is perceived to be. 
And clustered around this fundamental disagreement are a host of other disagree-
ments, problems, and perplexities, all combining to guarantee that a discussion 
of the topic rarely follows a straight path from premises to conclusion. 
If this description of the state of the controversy is even approximately correct, 
it would seem that no simple, straightforward argument is likely to contribute 
much towards its resolution. Such an argument might, to be sure, capture effec-
tively what one side in the discussion perceives as the grounds for its position. 
But the complexity of the surrounding issues, and especially the disagreement 
over a central intuition, make it unlikely that such a straightline approach will 
convince those who need to be convinced. 
I believe, therefore, that an illuminating treatment of this topic must take a 
more subtle and dialectical approach. The aim must be to strip away, one by 
one, the surrounding complexities in order to reveal the core disagreement. 
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Fonnal arguments will have their role to play in this, but only as part of a larger 
process which seeks to elucidate the total philosophical context within which 
the arguments must function. 
Specifically, the procedure in the present paper will be as follows: We shall 
begin with a brief, straightforward argument for the incompatibility of free will 
and divine foreknowledge. (Henceforth I shall refer to proponents of this view 
as incompatibilists, and to its opponents as compatibilists. This is the only way 
these tenns will be used in this essay.) After a brief criticism, this simple 
argument will be replaced by a somewhat more complex argument for the same 
conclusion. This is followed by a discussion of this argument and of some clearly 
inadequate compatibilist replies to it. Here, also, we will consider briefly alter-
native ways proposed by incompatibilists for dealing with God's knowledge of 
the future--e.g., the doctrine of divine timelessness. Finally, we shall consider 
the strongest, most serious arguments advanced by the compatibilists in their 
attempt to overcome the argument for incompatibilism. 
I. Two Arguments 
As has become customary in this discussion, the arguments for incompatibilism 
will be presented in tenns of specific examples; since the examples will not be 
unique in any way that is relevant to the soundness of the arguments, the results 
can easily be generalized. But philosophers who have become weary of following 
Jones through his intenninable project of mowing the lawn will be happy to 
learn that a new example is in the offing: our concern in the following pages 
will be with Clarence, an afficionado of cheese omelets, and with the question, 
will Clarence have such an omelet for breakfast tomorrow morning, or won't he? 
The first argument for incompatibilism begins by assuming that Clarence will, 
in fact, have a cheese omelet tomorrow morning, and it argues that Clarence's 
eating that omelet is necessary, hence not a matter of free choice. The argument 
goes like this: 
(AI) Necessarily, God has always believed that Clarence would have 
a cheese omelet tomorrow morning. (Premise) 
(A2) Necessarily, if God has always believed that a certain thing will 
happen, then that thing will happen. (Premise: divine infallibility) 
(A3) Therefore: Necessarily, Clarence will have a cheese omelet tomor-
row. (From 1,2) 
This argument has some impressive merits. It is complete, with no suppressed 
premises, and as concise as one could ask. Its validity is beyond reasonable 
doubt, and it will be sound if any incompatibilist argument for this conclusion 
is sound. Yet its very conciseness works against it usefulness as a tool for 
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analyzing the controversy. The purpose of the argument, after all, is to say 
something about free will and therefore about what Clarence has it in his power 
to do-but these topics are present in argument (A) only by implication. Also, 
the first premise makes assumptions about the relation of God's knowledge to 
events in time, and these assumptions need to be made explicit so they can be 
examined. But the most serious deficiency of argument (A) concerns the modal 
operator in the first premise. 'Necessarily' here does not refer to logical necessity, 
as it does in the second premise; it is not claimed that God has the belief in 
question in all possible worlds. Rather, 'necessarily' in the first premise refers 
to the"necessity of the past"; God's having held this belief is now necessary 
because it has already happened. And it is this necessity which is, as it were, 
transmitted across the entailment stated in the second premise to appear again 
in the conclusion. But it is crystal clear that this notion, the idea of the necessity 
of the past, is the most crucial, difficult, and contentious element in the entire 
controversy. Clearly, an argument which is to throw light on the controversy 
must do more with this notion than baldly assert it. 
With these considerations in mind, let us try another argument: 
(B 1) It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast 
tomorrow. (Premise) 
(B2) It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, 
or fail to believe anything which is true. (Premise: divine omniscience) 
(B3) Therefore, God has always believed that Clarence will have a 
cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 1,2) 
(B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's 
power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. 
(Premise: the unalterability of the past) 
(B5) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God 
has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. 
(From 3,4) 
(B6) It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed 
that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and that he 
does not in fact have one. (From 2) 
(B7) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to refrain from having a 
cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 5,6) So Clarence's eating 
the omelet tomorrow is not an act of free choice. 
II. Comments and Objections 
Clearly this argument could be further expanded; still, it can serve as a basis 
for analysis. It does meet the objections raised against argument (A): It speaks 
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explicitly about what it is in Clarence's power to do, it makes explicit the 
conception of divine omniscience which the argument assumes, and it deals with 
the necessity (or unalterability) of the past in a way which is at least somewhat 
less opaque than (A). We now proceed to some further comments on argument 
(B), together with some compatibilist answers to the argument. 
First, note that the conception of free will implicit in (B7) is a libertarian 
conception; it can be formulated as follows: 
(FW) N is free at T with regard to performing A = df 
It is in N's power at T to perform A, and it is 
in N's power at T to refrain from performing A. 
(Note that 'power' is used here in such a way that if it is in a person's power 
to perform a certain action in given circumstances, there is nothing in those 
circumstances which prevents or precludes that action's being performed. This 
conception of free will is basic to the whole discussion: if it were held that free 
will is compatible with causal determination there would be no significant addi-
tional problem in reconciling free will with divine foreknowledge.) 
It will be noted that arguments (A) and (B), while ostensibly about divine 
foreknowledge, refer explicitly to God's belief. The reason for this should be 
obvious: in general, 
(1) N knows at T that P 
entails 
(2) (N believes at T that P) & P. 
Now, the necessity asserted in (Al), and the unalterability asserted in (B4), are 
held to attach to God's past beliefs because they are past. But to assert that 
either (1) or (2) is thus necessary would be to assume that the state of affairs 
described by 'P' is itself necessary, even if it lies in the future. This of course 
is what the argument is trying to establish; it will not do to simply assume it as 
a premise. The arguments do however assume that God holds these beliefs with 
absolute certainty rather than probabilistically. 
This is, perhaps, an appropriate place to mention an objection to inc om-
patibilism which is fairly frequent: Sometimes we ourselves know what another 
person is going to do (say, in anticipating a friend's reaction to some situation 
which has arisen), and we do not suppose that our knowing this is incompatible 
with their acting freely-so why suppose such an incompatibility when it is God 
who knows? The short answer to this is that arguments (A) and (B) do not 
proceed from God's knowledge as a premise but from God's belief, and no one 
supposes that a human being's believing something entails the truth of what is 
believed. But there may be more to the objection than this. If Susan, his wife, 
knows that Clarence will have an omelet for breakfast tomorrow, it must be true 
not only that she believes this but also that she has adequate evidence for her 
belief (she knows about his addiction to cheese omelets, he came home yesterday 
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with a new hunk of sharp cheddar, and so on). And (it may be supposed) this 
justifying evidence must be sufficient to exclude the possibility that Clarence 
will not have an omelet; otherwise she could not be said to know that he will. 
In general, however, this need not be true. We often ascribe knowledge in 
situations where the justifying evidence is insufficient to warrant absolute cer-
tainty. And surely this is one of those situations: whatever evidence Susan may 
have is surely compatible with its being possible that Clarence will decide not 
to have an omelet tomorrow, and therefore with its being a matter of free choice 
whether he has one or not. If on the other hand the requirements for knowledge 
is strengthened to absolute certainty, then it is perfectly plausible to suppose that 
we never do have knowledge of future free actions. 
Another frequent objection against incompatibilism is that this view wrongly 
assumes that God's prior knowledge of what a person will do causes the sub-
sequent action. But if I know (for instance) that you are walking across the 
street, this does not cause you to walk across the street, so why assume that it 
is different with God? This is true enough, but a careful examination of arguments 
(A) and (B) will reveal that neither argument makes the claim that God's knowl-
edge (or belief) causes the event which He knows. They merely assert that it is 
impossible that God should believe that an event will happen and yet the event 
not occur. And this is certainly true. But what, if anything, causes Clarence to 
eat the omelet is left as a problem for further study. (It may further be observed 
that (A) and (B) are both compatible with the assumption that God's belief is 
caused retroactively by the future action.) 
Another important point about arguments (A) and (B) is that neither one raises 
the question of how God is able to know future actions. One might argue that 
God can do this only if sufficient causal conditions of the actions already exist; 
thus a world in which such knowledge is possible for God is of necessity a 
deterministic one. Such an argument might possibly be sound, but its major 
premise is exceedingly difficult to establish. Alternative accounts of God's knowl-
edge of future actions are available, accounts which do not involve the presence 
of sufficient causal conditions. (To mention two examples, God's knowledge 
might result through retroactive causation from the actual future events--or, he 
might know future actions in virtue of his knowledge of the "counterfactuals of 
freedom" (Plantinga).) The task of disposing of such alternative accounts is 
formidable enough to make the suggested argument unattractive. But, to repeat 
the point, neither (A) nor (B) relies on assumptions about how God is able to 
know what he knows. 
There is one further objection to incompatibilism which should be mentioned 
here. The incompatibilist claims that if God foreknows a person's action, then 
the action is not free. But, it is pointed out, if God foreknows that some person 
will freely choose a certain action, what follows is that the action will be done 
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freely, which is the reverse of the conclusion desired by the incompatibilist. I 
mention this argument because I have heard it from reputable philosophers, but 
a moment's thought will reveal its vacuity. Certainly, "God believes that N will 
freely do A" entails "N will do A freely." But arguments (A) and (B) claim to 
establish that this same premise also entails "N will do A of necessity." And 
the new entailment does not cancel the old, nor does this argument do anything 
to undermine either (A) or (B). (In general, whenever it is claimed that "P" 
entails "Q," one can truly assert that "P & -Q" entails "-Q," but this has no 
tendency whatever to show that "P" does not entail "Q".)2 
III. Some Incompatibilist Solutions 
Before we consider still more objections to incompatibilism, it will be well 
to examine some of the solutions given by incompatibilists to the problem which 
is posed by the (alleged) success of their argument. That there is such a problem 
cannot be denied. There are a number of Scriptural passages for which the most 
obvious interpretation would seem to be that God knows in advance the free 
actions of human beings. And this also seems to be a fairly straightforward 
inference from the basic theological doctrine of divine omniscience. The incom-
patibilist who does not wish to reject these important elements of Scripture and 
theology must provide his own interpretations at these points. It lies beyond the 
scope of this essay to engage in a detailed examination of Biblical passages, but 
we will survey the various theological answers to the problem of divine omnis-
cience and free action. 
No doubt the most direct solution is simply to deny that free will, in the 
libertarian sense, exists at all. This is Jonathan Edwards' reaction to the argu-
ment--or rather, this was the prior conviction that made him receptive to the 
argument in the first place. It seems to me that much of the charm of Edwards' 
presentation of incompatibilism comes from the undisguised gusto with which 
he rams home the conclusions of his arguments. He does not (like Boethius and 
Aquinas) view incompatibilism as a problem for which a solution must be found. 
Rather, he finds in it a ready-made club with which to beat his Arminian opponents 
over the head. Do they find the consequences of his doctrine of predestination 
repellent and obnoxious? Very well, he will prove to them that the very same 
consequences follow from a doctrine which they themselves cannot deny, namely 
foreknowledge. 
Most incompatibilists, however, have wished to affirm free will-in precisely 
the libertarian sense which Edwards denied. The incompatibilist arguments claim 
to show that free will, in this sense, is incompatible with foreknowledge, so that 
to affirm free will one must deny foreknowledge. The problem is to show how 
this is compatible with divine omniscience. 
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It will be helpful to approach this problem by way of argument (B). The 
incompatibilist holds this argument to be valid, so if the conclusion is to be 
avoided at least one of the premises must be false. Since the incompatibilist is 
in no way willing to give up (B4), which affirms the unalterability of the past, 
the remaining possibilities are (B 1) and (B2). 
Suppose, then, that we deny (BI), the premise which says that it is now true 
that Clarence will eat an omelet tomorrow. To deny this is not to say that Clarence 
will not eat an omelet, but rather that it isn't now true either that he will eat one 
or that he will not. If Susan were to conjecture, on the basis of his known 
addiction to cheese omelets, that "Clarence will have an omelet tomorrow," then 
what she says may come true tomorrow morning but it isn't true now; as of 
now, there just isn't any truth about what Clarence will eat for breakfast tomorrow. 
The view that there are no truths about future contingent events is traced back 
to Aristotle; it was adopted (with certain complications) by Thomas Aquinas, 
and has been revived in our day by A. N. Prior and Peter Geach. 3 It has been 
my observation that philosophers often react against it with a vehemence that 
bears little relation to any demonstrated logical inadequacies.4 It is somehow 
bizarre, or outrageous, or just downright offensive to suggest that this view 
might be correct. It seems to me that this is an over-reaction. In all likelihood 
what is at stake here is not a matter of logical correctness or incorrectness, but 
rather a matter of terminology: just how shall we use the words 'true', 'truth' 
and so on?5 And it does not seem to me that our ordinary, pre-philosophical 
usage of these words clearly settles the matter one way or the other. (For example, 
we sometimes say of a prediction that it has "come true," which is not quite the 
same as saying that it was true all along. I note, also, that philosophically 
unsophisticated students do not, on the whole, find the Aristotle-Prior view 
especially odd or bizarre when it is presented to them in class.) So perhaps this 
is an appropriate point at which to invoke Rudolph Carnap's "Principle of Toler-
ance": "Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, 
but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms."" 
However this may be, it is clear that many theists will find this view unaccept-
able for theological reasons: it implies that there are significant aspects of the 
future, especially those concerning the future free actions of persons, about 
which God as yet has neither definite beliefs nor knowledge. Still, the view we 
are considering affirms God's omniscience; premise (B2) is accepted without 
reservation. The matters God doesn't yet know about are matters about which 
there isn't, as yet, any truth to be known. As soon as there are such truths, God 
will be the first to know! 
It has been pointed out by Richard Swinburne that results which are essentially 
similar can be reached in another way, namely by modifying the definition of 
omniscience. 7 There is an interesting parallel here with omnipotence: many phi-
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losophers would now agree that God's omnipotence means that he has the power 
to do, not indeed everything, but everything which it is logically possible for 
him to do. Should we not, then, define omniscience by saying that God knows 
everything which it is logically possible for him to know? If we modify (B2) in 
accordance with this suggestion, the result is: 
(B2') It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, 
or fail to believe any true proposition such that his knowing that 
proposition at that time is logically possible. 
It seems to me that (B2') has considerable appeal even apart from incom-
patibilism's problem with foreknowledge. It will be noted that (B2') does not 
affirm or presuppose that there are truths which it is logically impossible for 
God to know, but by leaving this possibility open it achieves a generality which 
is lacking in (B2) itself. And on the other hand, most compatibilists presumably 
do not want to claim that there are truths which God knows in spite of its being 
logically impossible for him to know them! 
When argument (B) is modified along the lines of this suggestion (call the 
new argument (B'», the results are interesting. The revised argument starts out 
with (Bl) and (B2'). The text of the next step is the same as that of (B3), but 
it is not derivable from (Bl) and (B2'), because it is not known whether (Bl) 
satisfies the restriction in (B2'). So we have 
(B3') God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet 
tomorrow. (Assumption for indirect proof.) 
(B4) through (B7) are taken over intact from the original proof. We then add: 
(BS') Clarence will act freely when he eats the omelet for breakfast 
tomorrow. (Premise) 
This of course contradicts (B7), so we can proceed to the conclusion: 
(B9') It is not the case that God has always believed that Clarence will 
have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 3-8, indirect 
proof.) 
This argument suggests what may be a promising strategy for resolving the 
entire controversy. Perhaps the compatibilist and the incompatibilist should begin 
by agreeing to accept (B2') as their definition of omniscience: this ought to be 
possible, since (as noted above) the formula entails nothing to which either party 
has reason to object. They will then proceed to resolve their differences about 
the validity of the incompatibilist arguments (B) and (B')-admittedly, not an 
easy task! But once this has been done, essentially complete agreement will have 
been reached; there will be no occasion (in view of the prior agreement to (B2') 
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for any further disputes about the meaning of 'omniscient'. 
There is another way of avoiding the conclusion of (B) which historically has 
won much more acceptance than the views we have been considering. The 
reference, of course, is to the doctrine of divine timelessness. It lies beyond the 
scope of this paper either to expound this doctrine or to defend it against objec-
tions. 8 The doctrine of timelessness is frequently rejected as unintelligible, but 
attempts to demonstrate the unintelligibility do not seem to have been successful. 
Our present concern, however, is limited to seeing how the doctrine of timeless-
ness resolves the problem of free will and foreknowledge. 
Unlike the views just considered, the doctrine of timelessness affirms God's 
comprehensive knowledge of our future instead of removing from that knowledge 
events which are as yet contingent and indeterminate. But this knowledge is not, 
literally,foreknowledge at all; rather it is eternal knowledge, knowledge which 
exists at no time whatever, but only in the eternity of God's own timeless being. 
(Note that it is a cardinal error to consider God's eternal present as simultaneous 
with our present moment, or indeed with any moment at all of our time. Once 
this error is committed, the doctrine of timelessness collapses into chaos and 
contradiction.) By denying that God's eternal knowledge has a place in our 
time-sequence, the doctrine of timelessness removes an essential premise in the 
argument from foreknowledge to theological fatalism. 
It is instructive to view this solution, also, in relation to argument (B). Once 
again, the definition of omniscience (B2) will have to be modified, this time to: 
(B2 *) It is impossible that God should believe anything false, or fail to 
believe timelessly anything that is true. 
From this, together with (Bl), we get: 
(B3*) Therefore, God timelessly believes that Clarence will have a 
cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. 
But in order to avoid the deterministic conclusion, we must affirm instead of 
(B4) that: 
(B4*) It may sometimes be true that God timelessly believes a certain 
thing, and yet it is in someone' s power to bring it about that God 
does not timelessly believe that thing. 
Here we see the importance of the point that God's timeless present is not 
identical with any moment of our time. If God believes now, at the present time, 
that Clarence will have an omelet, then it is already too late for Clarence to do 
anything that would prevent God from having had that belief. But, to repeat this 
once more, God does not (according to the doctrine of timelessness) believe 
this, or anything else, at the present time. Rather, he believes things timelessly, 
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entirely outside of our time-sequence. And what it is that God timelessly believes 
depends, in part, on what Clarence will freely choose to do tomorrow morning. 
The doctrine of divine timelessness is surely a strange and difficult one, and 
nothing like a comprehensive assessment of it can be attempted in the present 
paper. But it does present a way, and perhaps (if the incompatibilist arguments 
are valid) the only way, to affirm consistently both that God has comprehensive 
knowledge of our future, and that we ourselves shall freely determine what, in 
certain respects, that future will be. 
IV. God's Beliefs as "Soft Facts" 
In a sense, everything to this point is preliminary to the main task of this 
paper. We have stated, in two different versions, the main argument for incom-
patibilism, rejected some clearly inadequate compatibilist replies to it, and 
reviewed various methods which are available to the incompatibilist for handling 
the theological problem created by his position. But the most serious and formid-
able replies to the incompatibilist arguments remain to be dealt with. All of these 
replies challenge, in different ways the use made by the incompatibilist of the 
fundamental intuition which lies at the heart of his position-the intuition, 
namely, that the past is necessary, fixed, and unalterable in some way in which 
the future is not. In the present section we shall examine the contention that 
God's beliefs about the future are "soft facts," while the next two sections deal 
with various claims about our power over the past. 
The view that God's beliefs are "soft facts"9 accepts without question the 
intuition that the past is fixed, unpreventable and beyond our control in a way 
in which the future is not. As Alvin Plantinga puts it: 
Although I now have the power to raise my arm, I do not have the 
power to bring it about that I raised my arm five minutes ago. Although 
it is now within my power to think about Vienna, it is not now within 
my power to bring it about that five minutes ago I was thinking about 
Vienna. The past is fixed in a way in which the future is open. It is 
within my power to help determine how the future shall be; but it is 
too late to do the same with respect to the past. 10 
So far, the incompatibilist is in hearty agreement, and it may seem just a small 
step from these remarks of Planting a's to (AI), which affirms that God's believing 
that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow is necessary. But 
the compatibilist refuses to take this step. He points out, quite correctly as we 
shall see, that the necessity of the past must be restricted in its scope if it is not 
to generate some implausible and wildly counterintuitive consequences. For 
instance, what about 
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(3) A new U.S. President will be elected in 1984? 
This mayor may not be true, but if it is true so is 
(4) It was true in 1976 that a new U.S. President would be elected in 1984. 
This is in some sense a proposition about the past (I am writing this in 1983), 
but is it therefore necessary? Was it already "too late" in 1976 ( and indeed long 
before that) for any of us to help determine who will be elected President in 
1984? This of course is the problem of logical determinism or fatalism, and if 
fatalism is to be avoided (as intuitively it must be) there must be some way to 
exclude propositions such as (4) from those propositions about the past which 
are necessary, not within our power, and so on. We must, in other words, 
d:lstinguish "hard facts" about the past from "soft facts." 
One's first reaction is likely to be that there is something shady and disreputable 
about "facts about the past" such as (4). This proposition, we want to say, is 
not "really about" the past; it does not describe anything that "really happened" 
in the past. And this may well be true; intuitively there does seem to be a relevant 
difference between (4) and 
(5) Jimmy Carter was elected President in 1976 
with respect to pastness. The problem is that while phrases like "really about 
the past" and "really happened" evoke an intuitive response, they are not sufficient 
to delineate the (supposed) logical distinction between (4) and (5) which qualifies 
(5) as a hard fact and (4) as a soft fact. And not all of the problem cases are as 
transparent as (4). Consider, for instance, 
(6) David said yesterday that Sandra will an·ive tomorrow. 
This seems to be really about the past, but what about: 
(7) David yesterday said truly that Sandra will arrive tomorrow? 
If (7) is true, should we conclude that Sandra's arrival is already necessary, 
unpreventable, beyond anyone's control, and so on? And what about 
(8) Everything David said yesterday was true? 
This, again, speaks about what happened yesterday, and (unlike (7» it does not 
even entail any propositions about the future. Yet when conjoined with (6), 
which intuitively should be a hard fact about the past, it entails 
(9) Sandra will arrive tomorrow. 
Just one other example will be considered: what shall we say about 
(10) Either David has already arrived or he will arrive tomorrow? 
132 William Hasker 
Assuming this to be true, is it a hard fact or a soft fact? The first disjunct by 
itself, if true, is a hard fact; the second disjunct, if true, is a soft fact. What 
then shall we say of the entire disjunction? 
These examples show, I think, that the project of distinguishing between hard 
facts and soft facts is both necessary and non-trivial. And the compatibilist 
believes that this distinction can be used to thwart the arguments for incom-
patibilism. For, he argues, whatever other problems may be involved in the 
distinction, it should at least be clear that propositions "about" the past which 
entail propositions concerning the future-such as (4) and (7)--cannot be counted 
as hard facts. 
But now consider once again 
(B3') God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelet 
for breakfast tomorrow. 
If God is essentially omniscient-that is, if (A2) and (B2) are true-then (B3') 
entails 
(11) Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. 
and this is clearly about the future, so (B3') cannot be a hard fact; it cannot be 
necessary in the sense in which many other propositions about the past are 
necessary. 
Is this conclusion correct? Perhaps the answer to this must wait until we have 
devised an adequate criterion for distinguishing hard from soft facts. But it is 
not at all evident that the compatibilist is drawing the right conclusion from the 
situation. There seems to be no doubt that (B3'), unlike (4), is "really about the 
past"; it asserts that God has performed a certain mental act (or perhaps, been 
in a certain mental state) throughout all ages past. It is, in this sense, just as 
much a part of the past that God believed this about Clarence as that David said 
that Sandra would arrive tomorrow. It is true that God, unlike David, is essentially 
omniscient. But how is this relevant to the question of whether God's past beliefs, 
like David's past statements, are now fixed and unalterable? How does God's 
omniscience give us a power over God's past beliefs that we don't have over 
David's past statements? To be sure, it follows from God's omniscience that 
(B3') and (11) are either both soft facts or both hard facts, in spite of our natural 
tendency to think that (B3') is hard and (11) soft. But which way does the 
inference go-from the softness of (11) to the softness of (B3'), or from the 
hardness of (B3') to the hardness of (11)? This is what the whole controversy 
is about, and it is at least not obvious that the compatibilist's way of drawing 
the inference is the correct one. 
But how shall we distinguish the hard facts?!! A hard fact may be defined as 
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND NECESSITY 133 
a proposition which is true (that is its factuality) and which is such that it is 
impossible that anyone should have the power to bring it about that it is false 
(that is its hardness, which in the most typical case is a result of its being about 
the past.) Our strategy here is to begin by delimiting a class of future-indifferent 
propositions whose truth or falsity cannot be affected by anything which happens 
after the present moment. The future-indifferent propositions which are true, 
along with some others, will then be our hard facts. 
We begin by identifying a set of propositions which are "elementary" or 
"atomic" roughly in the sense of the Tractatus or the early Russell-propositions 
which say of some individual that it has a certain property, or of two or more 
individuals that they stand in a certain relation. (Many of these propositions will 
state that an individual has a property at a specified time; they will be of the 
form, 'S has P at T'.) These elementary propositions will not include any whose 
most natural representation is as quantifications or truth-functions. (I am well 
aware that it is possible to contrive examples in which extremely complex prop-
ositions are represented in what appears to be simple subject-predicate form. For 
the time being all I am able to do is to rule out these examples on an ad hoc 
basis.) Having identified the elementary propositions, we proceed as follows: 
(el) An elementary proposition is future-indifferent IFF it is consistent 
with there being no times after the present, and also consistent 
with there being times after the present. 
The intuitive idea here is that a future-indifferent proposition must permit, but 
not require, that the entire universe should disappear and there be nothing at all 
after the present moment. One further point must be noted: the consistency 
mentioned in (el) is to be determined through the ordinary methods of logical 
inference, without recourse to de re modalities, i.e. to truths about the essential 
properties of individual entities. The reason for this should be clear after a little 
reflection. Our aim is to delineate the future-indifferent propositions, those which 
are really about the past, and (el) does this in the way noted. But it seems very 
likely that many if not all individuals have essential properties which imply 
things about them at times other than the present. Just what these essential 
properties are depends in part on which over all view of the world is true, but 
consider the following examples: If some form of scientific naturalism is true, 
then it is plausible that each spatio-temporal entity has essentially the property 
of being such that it will continue in existence until it ceases to exist through 
natural transformations. And these natural transformations both take time to 
happen, and leave something else in existence in place of the entity that has 
perished-so a presently existing stone (for example) has essential properties 
which are inconsistent with the world's ceasing to exist at this moment. Yet 
intuitively this should have no bearing on whether "this stone has existed for 
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three billion years" is a fact about the past rather than the future. For another 
example: if theism is true, then each contingent individual has essentially the 
property, being a creature of God. But this entails God's existence, which in 
tum (since God is essentially everlasting) entails that there will be times after 
the present. If considerations of this sort are relevant to the notion of a future-indif-
ferent proposition, then there will be few such propositions-but clearly, they 
are not relevant. 
We now proceed as follows: 
(C2) A truth-functional proposition is future-indifferent if each of its 
component propositions is future-indifferent. 
(C3) An existentially quantified proposition is future-indifferent if each 
of its possible instances is future-indifferent. 
(C4) Any proposition equivalent to a future-indifferent proposition is 
itself future-indifferent. 
Now we are ready for hard facts: 
(C5) Any future-indifferent proposition which is true is a hard fact. 
(C6) Any necessary truth is a hard fact. 
Here we include truths which are logically necessary both de dicto and de re. 
In (CI) our concern was with those truths which are "really about the past," and 
(for the reasons given) de re modal principles are not relevant to this. A hard 
fact, on the other hand, is a proposition such that it is not possible that anyone 
whatever should have the power to bring it about that it is false, and to this de 
re modalities are relevant: no one (not even God) can bring it about that a given 
individual exists but lacks one of its essential properties. 
Finally, 
(C7) Any proposition which is entailed by one or more hard facts is a 
hard fact. 
It is interesting to see how these criteria handle the examples given earlier. 
Clearly (5) will be a hard fact whereas (3) and (4) will not. (That is to say: (3) 
and (4) appear not to be hard facts on the basis of the information which is 
presently available. But (in virtue of (C7» they might tum out to be hard facts 
after all, if it turns out that they are entailed by some conjunction of hard facts. 
(And so for the other examples.) (6) will also be a hard fact, since it entails 
nothing about the truth or falsity of the embedded proposition. (7) is equivalent to 
(12) David said yesterday that Sandra will arrive tomorrow, and Sandra 
will arrive tomorrow. 
The first conjunct, if true, is a hard fact, but the second is not, so neither is (12) 
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or (7) a hard fact. (8) is equivalent to 
(13) -(Ep)«David said yesterday that p) & -p). 
When (13) is instantiated, the first conjunct will be future-indifferent, but for 
many values of 'p' the second will not. So (8) and (13) are not future-indifferent 
and, even if true, are not hard facts. In (10) the first conjunct is future-indifferent 
but the second is not, so (10) is not future-indifferent. It will however be a hard 
fact in virtue of (C7), if the first conjunct is true. 
Now, what about (B3')? Is this proposition future-indifferent? In order to 
answer this, we need to know what is expressed by 'God'. Does it function 
simply as a non-connotative proper name, which serves to refer to the bearer 
but conveys no information about him? Or is 'God' like a title or a common 
noun in that it expresses something about the nature and status of the divine being? 
My inclination is to say that the term 'God' as we ordinarily use it does indeed 
express, if not God's essence, at least our conception of God. In view of this I 
would say that a principle such as (A2) is not only necessary de re, in that it 
formulates one of God's essential properties, but is also necessary de dicto in 
virtue of the meaning of the term 'God.' If this is so, (B3/) will not be future-indif-
ferent, since it will entail (11), a fact about the future. But (B3/) is by no means 
unique in this. Propositions such as "God spoke to Abraham," and even "God 
exists" will not be future-indifferent, for reasons analogous to those given in the 
discussion under (Cl). If we use the word 'God' in such a way that God must 
be an essentially everlasting being, then any proposition which entails God's 
existence entails that there is no last moment of time. 
Does this mean that "God exists," and "God created the universe out of 
nothing" are soft facts? The intention of the distinction between soft and hard 
facts was to distinguish between those propositions which are such that it might 
be in someone's power to make them false, from those for which this is impos-
sible. But it's absurd-isn't it?--to suggest that anyone, even God, should now 
have the power to bring it about that God does not exist or that he did not create 
the universe out of nothing. Do we then need a third category of facts? A 
colleague suggested to me that besides hard facts and soft facts, there may also 
be facts sunny-side-up. By why stop there? Why not scrambled facts, poached 
facts, and even facts Benedict? 
There is a better way. Consider the name 'Yahweh', which was used by the 
ancient Hebrews to refer to their God. They used this name (as a reading of 
Genesis will confirm) with no thought or connotation of such metaphysical 
attributes as essential omniscience, essential everlastingness, and the like. For 
a variety of reasons, this name for the deity is not in common use among 
present-day Christians or Jews, but nothing prevents us from reviving its use for 
a special purpose. And as we do so we will take care to avoid importing into 
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the name's significance such metaphysical notions as essential everlastingness. 
We will use the name, as the ancient Hebrews did, simply as a non-connotative 
proper name referring to that individual who in fact was, and is, the God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. 
Given this use of the name 'Yahweh', the proposition "Yahweh spoke to 
Abraham," is a future-indifferent proposition; unlike "God spoke to Abraham," 
it entails nothing about the existence of times later than the present. But by the 
same token, 
(14) Yahweh has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese 
omelet for breakfast tomorrow 
is a future-indifferent proposition; unlike (B3'), it entails nothing about Clarence's 
breakfast tomorrow, or Clarence's existence tomorrow, or even about whether 
there will be a tomorrow. And since we are assuming that (14) is true, it will 
also be a hard fact. 
Now the truthof(14), by itself, will not make (11) a hard fact. But now consider: 
(15) If Yahweh exists, Yahweh is God. 
This proposition is not logically necessary de dicto: its truth is not implied by 
the meanings of the terms in which it is expressed. And the proposition will not 
be future-indifferent, because its consequent entails God's existence. But it is, 
in a sense, a necessary truth: it expresses an essential property of Yahweh. There 
is no possible world in which Yahweh exists but is not God; no one, not even 
God himself and certainly no human being, could bring it about that Yahweh 
exists but is not God. So although (15) is not a future-indifferent proposition it 
is, in virtue of (C6), a hard fact. 
And now the denouement becomes clear. As hard facts, we have the following: 
(14) Yahweh has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese 
omelet for breakfast tomorrow. 
(15) If Yahweh exists, Yahweh is God. 
(A2) Necessarily, if God has always believed that a certain thing will 
happen, then that thing will happen. 
But of course, these jointly entail 
(11) Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. 
So (11), which is jointly entailed by a set of hard facts, is itself a hard fact: it 
is now unpreventable, so that it is utterly impossible that anyone at all, even 
God himself, should now have the power to bring it about that Clarence does 
not eat that omelet for breakfast tomorrow. 
If the analysis of "hard facts" which we have given is sound, the incompatibilist 
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND NECESSITY 137 
is triumphant. No doubt, however, it would be overly optimistic to expect the 
compatibilist at this point to fold his tents and steal silently away. For one thing 
our principles (CI)-(C7), while they are logically coherent and well-motivated, 
are certainly too complex to qualify as either obvious or self-evident. So the 
possibility remains that the incompatibilist may develop his own analysis of hard 
facts, according to which it will tum out that (II) cannot after all be derived as 
a hard fact. 
But even if the claim that God's beliefs are soft facts must be given up, the 
compatibilist's resources are not exhausted. For compatibilists have also made 
claims about powers we have over the past--claims which do not depend on the 
distinction between hard and soft facts. To these claims we now tum. 
V. Counter/actual Power Over The Past 
The next compatibilist view to be examined holds that we have powers over 
the past of a rather special sort, powers which are most adequately expressed 
by counterfactual propositions. This view was first advanced by Alvin Plantinga, 
in his criticism of Nelson Pike's argument for incompatibilism,12 and has since 
been endorsed by a number of other philosophers. 
In Pike's article, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," a pivotal role 
is played by the following premise: 
(P6) If God existed at T, and if God believed at T, that Jones would 
do X at T2, then if it was within Jones' power at T2 to refrain from 
doing X, then (1) it was within Jones' power at T2 to do something 
that would have brought it about that God held a false belief at T, , 
or (2) it was within Jones' power at T 2 to do something which 
would have brought it about that God did not hold the belief He 
held at T" of (3) it was within Jones' power at T2 to do something 
that would have brought it about that any person who believed at 
T, that Jones would do X at T2 (one of whom was, by hypothesis, 
God) held a false belief and thus was not God-that is, that God 
(who by hypothesis existed at T,) did not exist at T 1 Y 
Pike's argument contains three additional premises, each of which states that 
the kinds of powers attributed to Jones in subpoints (1)-(3) of (P6) are such that 
no one can have them; thus, he is able to conclude that under the stated conditions 
it cannot be in Jones' power at T2 to refrain from doing X. The additional 
premises are as follows: 
(P3) It is not within one's power at a given time to do something having 
a description that is logically contradictory. 
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(P4) It is not within one's power at a given time to do something that 
would bring it about that someone who held a certain belief at a 
time prior to the time in question did not hold that belief at the 
time prior to the time in question. 
(P5) It is not within one's power at a given time to do something that 
would bring it about that a person who existed at an earlier time 
did not exist at that earlier time. 14 
In his response to Pike's argument, Plantinga does not challenge the premises 
(P3)-(P5); he agrees that Jones cannot have any of the powers ruled out by those 
premises. Plantinga's challenge is directed at (P6), which he regards as false on 
the grounds that subpoints (1)-(3) of (P6) do not exhaust the possible ways in 
which Jones might have the power at T 2 to refrain from doing X. Pike himself 
had admitted, "I do not know how to argue that these are the only alternatives, 
but I have been unable to find another. "15 Plantinga comes to his assistance at 
this point, pointing out not one but three additional alternatives (each corres-
ponding to one of the subpoints (1)-(3», each of which would enable Jones to 
have the power in question without violating the restraints imposed by premises 
(P3)-(P5). These additional alternatives are not, however, independent of each 
other, and for our purposes it will be sufficient to examine one of them-the 
one which corresponds to subpoint (2) of (P6). 
In discussing this premise, Plantinga suggests that it is Pike's view that 
(PL51) God existed at T 1, and God believed at T j that Jones would do 
entails 
X at T2 , and it was within Jones' power to refrain from doing 
X at T2 
(PL53) It was within Jones' power at T 2 to do something that would 
have brought it about that God did not hold the belief He did 
hold at T j . 
Plantinga, however, finds (PL53) to be ambiguous. It might, conceivably, mean 
the same as 
(PL53a) It was within Jones' power, at Tb to do something such that 
if he had done it, then at T 1 God would have held a certain 
belief and also not held that belief. 
Plantinga goes on to say that "(53 a) is obviously and resoundingly false, but 
there is no reason whatever to think that (51) entails it. What (51) entails is rather 
(PL53b) It was within Jones's power at T2 to do something such that 
if he had done it, then God would not have held a belief that 
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in fact he did hold. 
This follows from (51) but is perfectly innocent. "16 Plantinga then goes on to 
discuss the situation in terms of possible worlds: 
Suppose again that (51) is true, and consider a world W in which Jones 
refrains from doing X. If God is essentially omniscient, then in this 
world W He is omniscient and hence does not believe at T 1 that Jones 
will do X at T2.17 
I think it is fairly clear what kind of power over the past Plantinga is attributing 
to Jones (and, by implication, to all of us). And we also can see where the 
plausibility of Pike's argument (a specious plausibility, according to Plantinga) 
comes from. We notice that God's having believed at TJ that Jones will do X 
at T2 is inconsistent with Jones' refraining from doing X at T2, and we conclude 
from this that it was not within Jones' power to refrain. What we fail to notice 
is, that if Jones were to refrain from doing X at T2 then God would not have 
believed at T J that Jones would do X at T 2' Our mistake is that we have changed 
our supposition about what Jones does (from acting to refraining) without 
changing our supposition about what God believed. 
Note, however, that Jones' power over the past has to be formulated very 
carefully. Plantinga does not attribute to Jones the power to do something which 
would bring about that God, who at T 1 believed that Jones would do X, did not 
believe this at T I' Jones' having this power would be inconsistent with Pike's 
premise (P4). (It would also be inconsistent with Plantinga's own statements 
about the fixity and stability of the past, quoted in the previous section.)18 No, 
the power attributed to Jones is the power to do something such that if he had 
done it, God would not have held a belief that in fact he did hold. The counter-
factual form is essential for stating this power that Jones has: it is counterJactual 
power over the past. 
Nor is Jones' power to affect the past limited to God's past beliefs. A world 
in which Jones refrained from doing X would necessarily be different from the 
actual world with respect to God's beliefs about what Jones would do, but it 
might well be different in other respects as well. For if God had foreknown that 
Jones would refrain from doing X, he might well have arranged other things 
differently than they are in the actual world. To take a historical example, if 
God had not known in advance that the Allied armies would be encircled at 
Dunkirk in June, 1940, he might not have prearranged the unusually calm weather 
which permitted the evacuation to be carried out with minimal loss of life. Thus, 
it may well be true not only that 
(16) If the allied armies had not been encircled at Dunkirk in June, 
1940, then God would not have believed, prior to 1940, that this 
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would happen 
but also that 
(17) If the Allied armies had not been encircled at Dunkirk in June, 
1940, then God would not have arranged the weather prior to that 
time in the way in which he actually did arrange it. 
In supposing that this sort of thing is possible (the particular example is my own) 
Plantinga is assuming a certain principle which I will call the Principle of 
Foreknowledge and Providence: 
(PFP) If God has always known that a certain person will perform a 
particular free action at a given time, then God may have acted 
at any previous time in the light of that knowledge in a way that 
is different from the way he would have acted if he had known 
that the person would perform a different action at that time. 
It should be noted that (PFP) is not a direct consequence of the doctrine of 
foreknowledge or of God's essential omnipotence. It is, I think, conceivable that 
God might possess comprehensive foreknowledge but never allow himself to be 
influenced by it in choosing his course of action. It may even be conceivable 
that God could not determine his course of action in view of future events which 
may themselves, in part, be consequences of that very action. But these pos-
sibilities have little appeal for the believer in foreknowledge, because they do 
not give him the theological benefits which he wishes to derive from foreknow-
ledge. Surely one of the main advantages of foreknowledges lies in the thought 
that God, having known in advance everything that will happen, has also prear-
ranged circumstances in view of this knowledge, so as to secure the fulfillment 
of his ultimate purposes. If God's knowledge doesn't have this result, then (to 
put the matter crudely) what good is it-either to him or to us? So while (PFP) 
is not entailed by either foreknowledge or essential omniscience, it seems to be 
something that most if not all believers in foreknow ledge would want to affirm. 
But if (PFP) is accepted, the potential scope of our power over the past becomes 
very large indeed. To be sure, it may be that we are very seldom in a position 
to know, or even plausibly conjecture, that God has arranged things in a certain 
way because of his foreknow ledge of some particular human action. (My example 
concerning Dunkirk is perhaps as plausible as most that could be thought of. 
But it involves assumptions about the justification of war in general, and about 
the righteousness of the Allied cause in World War II, which are highly contest-
able.) But is also true that there are very, very few facts about the past which 
are such that we can confidently say that they could not have been different, 
had God foreknown that people would choose freely in ways differently than 
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they actually did choose. To take Plantinga's own example: 
It is possible (though no doubt fantastically unlikely) that there is some-
thing you can do such that if you were to do it, then Abraham would 
never have existed. For perhaps you will be confronted with a decision 
of great importance-so important that one of the alternatives is such 
that if you were to choose it, then the course of human history would 
have been quite different from what in fact it is. Furthermore, it is 
possible that if God had foreseen that you would choose that alternative, 
he would have acted very differently. Perhaps he would have created 
different persons; perhaps, indeed, he would not have created Abraham. 
So it is possible that there is an action such that it is within your power 
to perform it and such that if you were to perform it, then God would 
not have created Abraham. 19 
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So the scope of our power over the past is, potentially at least, very extensive. 
Yet this is still counter factual power over the past, rather than power to bring 
about the past. As Plantinga says: 
Possibly there is something I can do such that, if I were to do it, then 
Abraham would not have existed; but it is not possible-is it?-that I 
now cause Abraham not to have existed. 20 
And his subsequent remarks indicate that, in his view, not even God now has 
it in his power to cause Abraham not to have existed. So much of the past may 
lie within our power, but it is counterfactual power and not power to bring about 
the past. 
No one who is familiar with the literature can doubt that Plantinga has given 
us a fascinating and provocative account of divine foreknowledge and providence. 
Of necessity much has been omitted here, and even the points that have been 
considered invite far more discussion than space will allow for. So we will 
confine our critical discussion of Plantinga to one point: his distinction between 
counterfactual power over the past and power to bring about the past. As we 
saw, the thing Plantinga objects to in Pike's original argument is Pike's contention 
that 
(PL51) God existed at TJ, and God believed at T) that Jones would do 
X at T2 , and it was within Jones' power to refrain from doing 
X at T2 
entails 
(PL53) It was within Jones' power at T2 to do something that would 
have brought it about that God did not hold the belief he did 
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hold at T\. 
Plantinga is able to avoid Pike's conclusion only after he has replaced (PL53) 
with the "perfectly innocent" 
(PL53b) It was within Jones' power at T2 to do something such that if 
he had done it, then God would not have held a belief that in 
fact he did hold. 
Now, is this replacement justified? Why did Pike suppose in the first place 
that (PL51) entails (PL53)? Was it a mere oversight, resulting from his failure 
to notice that (PL53b) is the correct conclusion to draw from (PL51)? One thing 
is certain: if (PL51) does after all entail (PL53), Plantinga's main argument 
against Pike is invalidated and he will have to begin all over again. 
Another way to see the importance of this distinction is to compare Plantinga' s 
view with our argument (B). If I understand Plantinga's position correctly, he 
does not deny any of the premises of argument (B). What he does deny is the 
validity of the inference from (B5) and (B6) to (B7). (This is, of course essentially 
the same inference as that from (PL51) to (PL53).) If the inference from (B5) 
and (B6) to (B7) is in fact valid, Plantinga will have to reconsider his whole 
position. 
Philip Quinn, in a forthcoming paper discussing the Pike-Plantinga controversy, 
has suggested a way in which this question might be settled. If the incompatibilist 
could vindicate a logical principle of a certain type (I will call such principles 
Power Entailment Principles), he could then use it to justify such inferences as 
the one from (PL51) to (PL53). Quinn himself proposes two candidates for such 
a principle, of which the first is 
(PEPI) If it is within S' s power to bring it about that P and if that P 
entails that Q, then it is within S' s power to bring it about that Q. 21 
(PEPl) is obviously false: Neil Armstrong's being the first human to walk on 
the moon entails that 2 + 2 = 4, but neither Armstrong nor anyone else has 
ever had the power to bring it about that this arithmetical proposition is true. 
Nor are matters any better for 
(PEP2) If it is within S' s power to bring it about that P and if that P 
entails that Q and if it is contingent that Q, then it is within S's 
power to bring it about that Q.22 
For Neil Armstrong's being the first human to walk on the moon entails that 
there is a moon, but certainly Armstrong never had the power to bring that 
about. At this point Quinn gives up the search for a true Power Entailment 
Principle: he says, "I have been unable to discover such a principle, and 1 very 
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much doubt that there is one."23 
The quest for such a principle has been taken up by Thomas Talbott in a recent 
paper. After reviewing the principle we have labeled (PEPl) and rehearsing its 
deficiencies, he proposes one of his own: 
(PEP3) If (a) it is within S's power to bring it about that P is true and 
(b) it is within S's power to bring it about that P is false and 
(c) P entails Q and not-P entails not-Q, then it is within S's 
power to bring it about that Q is true. 24 
About this principle, Talbott says that it "seems not only true but obviously true. 
Where P and Q are logically equivalent, it could hardly be up to me whether or 
not P is true unless it were also up to me whether or not Q is true."25 It seems 
to me that this is absolutely correct. And since, given Plantinga's assumption 
that God is a logically necessary being, "P" is logically equivalent to "God has 
always believed that P", it follows that (PEP3) shows that Plantinga's position 
is wrong. 
Talbott recognizes this, but he still goes on to look for a stronger principle, 
because there are valid cases of "power entailment" which are not instances of 
(PEP3). For instance, my having the power to draw a triangle certainly entails 
my having the power to draw a plane figure, in spite of the fact that "I draw a 
triangle" and "I draw a plane figure" are not equivalent. And such a principle 
is indeed available: it is 
(PEP4) If (a) it is within S's power to bring it about that P is true, (b) 
P entails Q, and (c) Q is not a necessary condition of S's having 
the power to bring it about that P is true, then it is within S' s 
power to bring it about that Q is true. 26 
Talbott's proof of this principle is both elegant and conclusive: 
If P entails Q, then it's within the power of a person S to bring it about 
that P is true only if at least one of these conditions is met: either Q is 
true or, if not true, then it's within S's power to bring it about that Q 
is true. Suppose, then, that P entails Q and it's not within S's power 
to bring it about that Q is true. It immediately follows that, unless Q 
is true, it's not within S's power to bring it about that P is true either; 
it follows, in other words, that Q is a necessary condition of S's having 
the power to bring it about that P is true. 27 
Now, apply this to (PL51). Is God's having believed at T J that Jones would 
refrain from doing X at T 2 a necessary condition of Jones' having the power to 
refrain from doing X at T2? If it is, then it follows immediately that Jones did 
not have this power. But (PL51) says that he did have such a power, so we are 
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forced to the other alternative: that Jones at T2 had it in his power to bring it 
about that God did not hold the belief he did hold at T l' And this, of course, is 
just what (PL53) says. So (PL51) does entail (PL53); of that there can be no 
reasonable doubt. And by similar reasoning. (B5) and (B6) entail (B7). 28 
These Power Entailment Principles show that, with respect to our power over 
God's past beliefs, the distinction between counterfactual power over the past 
and power to bring about the past collapses: it is a distinction which fails to 
distinguish. These principles do not, however, apply to such cases as our alleged 
power to act in such a way, that if we were to act in that way Abraham would 
never have existed. But there is another principle which, if true, would collapse 
the distinction in that case also. It is: 
(PEPS) If (a) it is within S's power to bring it about that P and (b) if 
it were the case that P it would be the case that Q and (c) its 
being the case that Q is not a necessary condition of S' shaving 
the power to bring it about that P, then it is within S's power 
to bring it about that Q. 
Is (PEP5) true? I believe it is, and I believe that an argument for (PEPS) which 
parallels Talbott's proof of (PEP4) would be a sound argument. Such an argument 
would, however, encounter certain complexities (such as the so-called "counter-
factuals of freedom") which are not present in the case of (PEP4). And our 
central concern in the present section is with our power to bring about God's 
past beliefs, not with our power to bring about good weather on the English 
Channel or the non-existence of Abraham. So while I believe that (PEPS) is 
true, I shall forbear at this point any further attempt to prove it. 
But concerning (PEP3) and (PEP4) there can be no reasonable doubt. And 
given those principles, there can be no reasonable doubt, either, that if we are 
to have the power to act in ways other than those in which God has always 
believed we would act, we must also have the power to bring it about that God 
has not believed the things which in fact he always has believed. 
VI. Preventing the Past 
Do we have power over the past? Among the very few philosophers who have 
considered this question and given an unequivocal affinnative answer must be 
numbered George Mavrodes. 29 We do indeed have power over the past. This 
power is not limited to the counterfactual power over the past discussed in the 
previous section; it is the power to directly, and indeed causally, bring about 
past events and also to prevent past events. And the past events to which this 
power extends are not limited to those involving God's knowledge or belief 
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about future events; rather, the power in question is quite general, so that in 
principle we may be able to bring about or prevent all of the same kinds of 
events in the past that we are able to bring about or prevent in the future. (A 
qualification is needed here. Mavrodes does not necessarily want to claim that 
we actually have power over all of these past events. He is, in fact, quite cautious 
in his claims about the powers which we actually have over past events; his 
point is that we could have such powers, that there is nothing logically incoherent 
in the idea that we might have them. There may very well be specific reasons 
why I cannot (for example) prevent Abraham's birth, just as there are specific 
reasons why I cannot swim from San Francisco to Honolulu. Mavrodes' claim, 
however, is that there is nothing logically incoherent in supposing that I might 
have either of these powers.) 
One more point needs to be added. It might be supposed that Mavrodes is 
claiming merely that we may, now, have the power to bring about those past 
events which have already occurred, and to prevent those events which have 
already failed to occur. Such powers as these would be remarkable enough, 
involving as they do retroactive causality. But Mavrodes is claiming more than 
this: in addition to the powers just mentioned, he claims that we also have the 
power to bring about past events which have not occurred, and to prevent events 
which have already occurred. 
In making these claims, Mavrodes is attacking the arguments for inc om-
patibilism in a profound and fundamental way, by rejecting the fundamental 
intuition on which all such arguments are built-the intuition of the necessity 
of the past. If he is right in rejecting this intuition, then incompatibilism cannot 
be defended. And on the other hand, it seems likely (and this is supported by 
the arguments in the previous sections) that no compatibilist position which does 
not reject this intuition can succeed. 
It will not be necessary to compare Mavrodes' position in a detailed way with 
the incompatibilist arguments which have been featured in this paper. For Mav-
rodes does not just nibble around the edges of premises such as (AI) and (B4); 
he rejects them outright. And without these premises, or others like them, the 
argument for incompatibilism cannot get off the ground. What remains to be 
done, then, is first to understand Mavrodes' claims about our powers over the 
past, and secondly to assess those claims, to determine as best we can whether 
they are true or false. 
What would it mean to bring about the past? What sort of power is this? I 
think it makes a difference here whether we are thinking of the power to bring 
about past events which have in fact taken place, or of the power to bring about 
events which might have taken place in the past but which in fact did not. 
Understanding the first kind of power is not difficult, if we are prepared to 
contemplate the possibility of retroactive causation: it is the power to perform 
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an action some of whose consequences are events in the past. Do we ever exercise 
this power? Mavrodes' claim is that we do this every day of our lives. For by 
performing any free action, I bring it about that God has always believed that I 
would perform that action, and by freely refraining from an action I prevent God 
from having believed I would perform it. 30 (These are the only specific examples 
of power over the past to which Mavrodes commits himself. It may be reasonable 
to assume that he would accept the Principle of Foreknowledge and Providence, 
and thus would agree that we sometimes have the power to influence the past 
indirectly in the way suggested by Plantinga. I think that Mavrodes would also 
want to say that there may be any number of other ways in which we have power 
over the past, only we don't at present know what those ways are.) 
But how shall we understand that other kind of power, the power to bring 
about events which might have taken place in the past but which in fact have 
not? In answering this question I shall proceed somewhat indirectly. We shall 
first consider several interpretations of Mavrodes' claim which might appear 
somewhat plausible, but which must be rejected. Only then will we turn to what 
I think is the correct interpretation of that claim. My reason for this roundabout 
procedure is that I find that claim to be extremely difficult to interpret, and I 
hope that consideration of several inadequate interpretations will help to motivate 
the acceptance of the correct one. (Readers who find claims about bringing about 
the past to be unproblematic are therefore invited to skip over the next few pages 
until they reach what they view as the "correct" interpretation!) 
One way of understanding this power is suggested by the counterfactual power 
over the past discussed in the last section: the power to bring about past events 
which have not in fact occurred may simply be the power to do something such 
that, if I were to do it, an event which in fact has not taken place in the past 
would have taken place. 
This is absolutely correct, but also totally unilluminating. We saw in the last 
section that Planting a conceived of counterfactual power over the past as an 
alternative to power to bring about the past: he thought it possible to afflrm our 
counterfactual power over God's past beliefs, while accepting Pike's premise 
(P4) It is not within one's power at a given time to do something that 
would bring it about that someone who held a certain belief at a 
time prior to the time in question did not hold that belief at the 
time prior to the time in question 
But we have seen that the notion of counterfactual power over the past as an 
alternative to power to bring about the past is a snare and a delusion: the 
compatibilist, if he is to be consistent, must afflrm our power to bring about 
the past, and if counterfactual power over the past is something less than this it 
is not the power we need if compatibilism is to be true. If on the other hand 
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counterfactual power over the past is simply the same as power to bring about 
the past, what is gained by the change in wording? And why make a point of 
describing just our powers over the past in counterfactual terms, rather than all 
of our other powers? Why not describe my power to greet the postman as the 
power to do something, such that if I were to do it then the postman would be 
greeted by me? Such a description would not be inaccurate, but what would be 
gained by it? I conclude, then, that while it is not inaccurate to describe our 
powers over the past in counterfactual terms, there is no reason to suppose that 
such a description conveys any additional illumination or brings us any closer 
to understanding what such powers really amount to. 
Plantinga, to be sure, also suggests a second possible interpretation of our 
power to bring about God's past beliefs. It is, he suggests, conceivable that 
Jones' "power at T2 to do something that would have brought it about that God 
did not hold the belief he held at T I" might be interpreted as Jones' "power, at 
T 2, to do something such that if he had done it, then at T I God would have held 
a certain belief and also not held that belief. "31 But this has nothing to recommend 
it as an interpretation of Jones' power. The reason for this is not simply that 
such a power would be logically absurd, for it may well tum out that the power 
to bring about God's past beliefs is logically absurd; indeed the incompatibilist 
believes that it is. But this interpretation of Jones' power would not perform, 
and would not even seem to perform, the function which it has in Pike's premise 
(P6). That premise enumerates three different kinds of powers, such that if it 
were possible for lanes to have powers of one or more of these kinds, it would 
be possible for Jones to be acting freely even though God knows beforehand 
what Jones is going to do. But the power to bring it about that God both has 
and does not have a certain belief would not fulfill this role: even if Jones 
(absurdly) had this power and exercised it, it would still be true that God believed 
at T I that Jones would do X at T 2 (although it would also be true that God did 
not have that belief), and so it would still be impossible for Jones to refrain from 
doing X at T 2. 
So this suggestion is unacceptable, yet reflecting on it may suggest to us yet 
another possible interpretation of our power over the past. For why is it that 
Jones (apparently) lacks freedom with respect to doing X at T2? The answer is, 
because there is a circumstance which obtains (namely, God's having always 
believed that Jones would do X at T2) which logically precludes Jones' refraining 
from doing X at T2 , and since it is not possible for Jones to refrain from doing 
X at T 2 it is also not possible for him to do X freely. (Let's call circumstances 
of this sort precluding circumstances.) 
Now, the precluding circumstances which affect our lives are not by any means 
limited to God's past beliefs. And perhaps considering how we deal with some 
other kinds of precluding circumstances will help us to see how Jones might be 
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free to refrain from doing X even though God has always believed that he would 
do X. Suppose, for example, that I am going on a trip to Romania, and in order 
to get the most out of my visit I promise myself that I will take the opportunity 
to converse with as many Romanians as possible. But there is a snag: I have 
never learned Romanian. However a remedy is available; some intensive work 
at my friendly neighborhood Berlitz school will soon equip me to carry on a 
passable conversation. It may be helpful to state this situation formally: 
(18) If at TIN had never learned Romanian, and it was in N's power 
at T2 to converse freely in Romanian, then it was in N's power to 
bring it about that whereas it was true at T, that N had never learned 
Romanian it was no longer true at T 2 that N had never learned 
Romanian. 
It should be noted that in order to have the power in question N must be able 
to bring it about that a certain past-tense proposition-in this case, "N has never 
learned Romanian"-is true at one point in time but false at a later point in time. 
But now consider: 
(19) If at T, God had always believed that Jones would do X at T2, 
and it was in Jones' power to refrain from doing X at T 2, then it 
was in Jones' power to bring it about that whereas it was true at 
T 1 that God had always believed that Jones would do X at T 2 it 
was no longer true at T2 that God had always believed that Jones 
would do X at T2. 
The parallelism between (18) and (19) is close and (I believe) also instructive. 
In one case, it is N's never having learned Romanian which precludes his 
conversing in that language; in the other case, it is God's always having believed 
that Jones would do X at T2 which precludes his refraining from doing X. In 
each case, if the precluding circumstance can be removed (i.e., if the past tense 
proposition which was formerly true can become false), the precluded action 
may become possible. In the case of N this can probably be done, but what 
about Jones? Here there is a complication. If the "believer" in (19) were anyone 
other than God, we might be able to persuade him to change his mind, and after 
the change of mind it would no longer be true that he had always believed that 
Jones would do X at T 2' But with God, things are somewhat different: by 
hypothesis, whatever God believes at one time he believes at all times, so the 
only way for Jones to bring it about that God has not always believed that Jones 
would do X at T 2 is for him to bring it about that God has never believed this. 
This is true enough. Nevertheless, I maintain that the power attributed to Jones 
in the consequent of (19) is indeed the power that Jones must have if he is to 
be free in the face of God's prior belief: it is the power to bring it about that 
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God has not believed the things which in fact he always has believed. 
At this point certain objections can be anticipated. Some one will say, "But 
that power would be the power to change the past!" I agree; I can think of no 
better expression for describing the kind of power mentioned in the consequent 
of (19). "But," the objector continues, "that is absurd; no one could possibly 
have the power to change the past!" Again, I agree; I am in no wayan advocate 
for powers of this kind. But, I add, a reader of the writings of George Mavrodes 
might easily receive the impression from certain passages that this philosopher 
does advocate the power to change the past. One of his examples is the coronation 
of Elizabeth II as Queen of England, and he asserts repeatedly that this event 
may even now be preventable. He explicitly rules out "sensible" interpretations 
of this, such as our now discovering that her coronation in 1953 was invalid due 
to some technicality. "No," he says, "I mean that, assuming that she has been 
Queen for many years, we might now be able to do something which would 
bring it about that she has never, up to the present time, been Queen."32 But if 
she has in fact been Queen for many years, and we can now bring it about that 
she has never been Queen, would that not be to change the past? 
I said that a reader of Mavrodes might receive this impression, but I must add 
at once that it would be a mistaken impression. Mavrodes explicitly rules out 
powers of the kind implied by (19)-the power to bring it about that there was 
"a time at which it was true that E has occurred, and a later time at which it 
was not true that E has occurred."33 And he lays great emphasis on the difference 
between the power to change the past and the power to determine the past-to 
bring about or to prevent past events. It is the latter power, and not the former, 
that he wishes to affirm. 
Now it is my contention that by admitting that we cannot have powers of the 
kind specified in the consequent of (19)-powers describable as powers to alter 
the past-Mavrodes in effect concedes the central premise of the incompatibilist 
argument, as expressed, for example, in 
(B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's 
power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. 
Mavrodes, however, would disagree; he holds that our inability to change the 
past, in the sense indicated by (19), is completely irrelevant to the necessity of 
the past as this is affirmed by the incompatibilist. For, he goes on to say, no 
one can change the future, either. 34 We can, to be sure, change our plans for 
the future, but the future itself-roughly, the set of states of affairs subsequent 
to the present that actually obtain-is what results after all such changes have 
been made. So to say that we can't change the past marks no genuine contrast 
and is not to the point. 
I think this is a red herring, but we must follow it up briefly lest someone be 
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led astray by it. First, with regard to the argument of this paper, it may be said 
that the expression, "changing the past" is of no importance whatever. I have 
argued that if compatibilism is to be true we humans must have powers of a 
certain kind, the kind specified in the consequent of (19). These powers, 1 agree, 
are aptly characterized as powers to change the past. But this characterization 
is of no importance for my argument: what matters is not what these powers are 
called but whether or not we have them. So far as the argument is concerned, 
they could be called powers to bring about the past, or powers to prevent the 
past, or powers to facilitate the past, or anything else you like. Now, if someone 
defines a set of powers which could be aptly characterized as powers to change 
the future, and shows that some important philosophical point hinges on whether 
we have these powers or don't have them, then the question of whether or not 
we can change the future will be of philosophical interest. But so far as the 
present argument is concerned, the question simply does not arise. 
That really should be sufficient, but I am going to abandon for a moment the 
formal context of my argument and comment on the notion of "changing the 
past" in its broader cultural context. For us in this culture (I cannot speak about 
others) it seems natural to think of the past as a determinate totality of some 
kind, consisting of all the facts and happenings up until now-it includes every-
thing that would be written about in a complete history of the entire universe. 
Having before our minds the idea of such a totality, a natural question is whether 
anything can now be done to change it-and the answer we all give (including 
George Mavrodes!) is that it cannot be changed. Now the question about whether 
the future can be changed doesn't seem to be a natural question in the same 
way-I don't think 1 have ever so much as encountered it, except in the writing 
of philosophers. To be sure, if we think of the future as a determinate totality-
say, as written in the book of Fate, or as a plan in the mind of God-then it 
makes sense to ask whether it can be changed---can we erase some of the writing 
in the book, or induce God to change his plan? But outside the context of such 
religious or philosophical doctrines, I submit that we simply don't operate with 
the idea of the future as a determinate totality. The future is seen rather as a 
realm of possibility, where all sorts of things can or might happen, but in which 
only the hazy outlines are discernable of a few things that will definitely happen. 
But in general, the future isn't made yet, so what sense would it make to talk 
about changing it? So in this context also, 1 want to say that the question of 
changing the future is one that does not arise. 
Let us briefly review our progress to date. We are trying to understand Mav-
rodes' claim that we can have power over the past-in particular, power to 
prevent events which have in fact already occurred. We considered the possibility 
of expressing this power in counterfactual terms, and we saw that this move 
gives no help whatever in our attempt to understand what such powers might 
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be. We also considered, and rejected, the notion that the power in question might 
be the power to bring it about that a certain event both has and has not occurred 
(e. g., to bring it about that God both held and did not hold a certain belief). 
Finally, we considered the possibility that the power might be the power to bring 
it about that whereas it was true at one time that a certain event had occurred, 
it was at a later time no longer true that this event had occurred-for example, 
to bring it about 
that whereas it was true at T J that God had always believed that Jones 
would do X at T 2 it was no longer true at T 2 that God had always 
believed that Jones would do X at T 2. 
I believe, and have argued above, that this is indeed the kind of power we must 
have if we are to be free in the face of God's past beliefs, i.e. if compatibilism 
is to be true. Nevertheless, this cannot possibly be the correct interpretation of 
Mavrodes' claim about our power over the past. For Mavrodes repudiates powers 
of the kind specified above-powers describable as powers to change the past-
and nevertheless he continues to claim that we may have the power to prevent 
events which have already occurred-for example, he claims that someone may, 
even now, have the power to prevent Elizabeth's coronation as the Queen of 
England. So the question becomes acute: How is this claim to be understood? 
I believe the right way to understand it is this. When he says that someone 
might even now have the power to prevent Elizabeth's coronation, he means 
that there may be a kind of action such that (1) someone has, or could have, all 
of the abilities, personal qualities, etc. which are requisite for performing such 
an action, and (2) such an action, if performed in 1983 or later, would have the 
effect that Elizabeth would never have become Queen. Mavrodes does not, 
however, think that it is possible that the actual world, the state of affairs which 
actually obtains and contains everything which has happened up to the present 
moment (including Elizabeth's coronation), should also contain this preventing 
action." It's not now possible that someone actually will prevent Elizabeth's 
coronation, given that she has in fact been crowned, any more than it's now 
possible that I should converse in Romanian, given that I have never learned 
Romanian. Just as my failure to learn Romanian precludes that act of conversing, 
so Elizabeth's coronation precludes that act of preventing. There is, however, 
an important difference between the cases: the condition of my never having 
learned Romanian is one that can be removed, so that even though it's not now 
possible for me to converse in that language, this may well become possible in 
the future. But Elizabeth's coronation cannot be removed from our past history, 
for that would be to change the past. So in this case, the circumstance which 
precludes the preventing action is permanent: it will not and cannot be removed. 
But how can Mavrodes say that someone might perform the preventing act, 
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or that someone may have the power to do so? We have to keep in mind that 
there is a sense of 'power' according to which a person's powers (normally) 
remain more or less constant, while the possibilities of their being exercised 
come and gO.36 If I complete my project of learning Romanian, I will have the 
power to converse in that language, but I will be able to exercise that power 
only when I am in the company of another Romanian-speaker. Now, let's suppose 
I am being questioned about my abilities. (The questioner is a Japanese exchange 
student who is working hard on learning his English modal auxiliaries.) 
"Can you carryon a conversation in Romanian?" 
"Yes, I can; actually I'm fairly fluent." 
"Excellent! Please demonstrate your ability!" 
"Well, I can't do it now. I mean, you don't speak Romanian, and neither does 
anyone else who is present." 
"But you just said that you can converse in Romanian." 
"No, but you didn't understand me. When I said that I can converse in 
Romanian, I didn't mean that I can do it now. What I meant was that I could 
converse in that language, if there were someone else present with whom to do 
so. Now do you see?" 
"Ah, so! Thank you very much!" 
It should be clear by now that when Mavrodes says that we can prevent 
Elizabeth's coronation, he is using this word as I used it when in my first reply 
I said that I can converse in Romanian-not as I used it in my second reply, 
when I said that I cannot do this in the absence of other speakers of the language. 
His 'can', like mine, is really a 'could .. .if.' And what goes for 'can' goes also 
for 'power.' And understanding this, we can also understand how Mavrodes can 
say that we have the power to prevent Elizabeth's coronation even though (as 
we have seen) it is not possible, given that she was in fact crowned, for us to 
exercise that power. 
At this point a pattern has begun to emerge-a pattern which the reader may 
already have identified. It is, in fact, the beginning of a familiar dialectic which 
results when a soft determinist is invited to discuss free will. Perhaps someone 
has committed a misdeed, and the soft determinist is asked whether the person 
could have done otherwise. The answer is that nothing compelled the commission 
of the misdeed, and that the culprit could have acted otherwise if he had willed 
to. Ah, but could he have willed to? He could have, if his character had been 
different than it is. But could that have been different? It could have, if some 
of his experiences earlier in life had been different ... At some point, a hard 
determinist (or a libertarian) breaks in to say that, at each stage, what would 
have to have been different in order for the person to respond differently could 
not have been different, and that therefore the supposed "freedom" to act otherwise 
is an illusion. It is not my present purpose to enter into this dialectic. My purpose, 
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND NECESSITY 153 
rather, is to point out that the uses of 'can', 'power', 'ability' and similar words 
which generate this dialectic are exactly the same as the uses of these words 
employed by Mavrodes when he is explaining our power to prevent the past. 
Am I saying that Mavrodes is a soft determinist? Certainly he does not want 
to be and does not intend to be. But would it not be a striking confirmation of 
the incompatibilist's thesis if it turns out that a compatibilist who wishes to 
affirm our power over the past but to deny our power to change the past, finds 
himself compelled to use crucial terms like 'can' and 'power' in a way which 
generates "free will" only in the soft determinist sense and not in the libertarian 
sense of that term? 
What I have been saying about Mavrodes in this connection will apply to 
other compatibilists as well. Take Plantinga, for instance: when he affirms that 
(PL53b) It was within Jones's power at T2 to do something such that 
if he had done it, then God would not have held a belief that 
in fact he did hold 
does he really think it possible that the actual world, the world which in fact 
contains God's belief that Jones would do X at Tz, should also contain Jones' 
refraining from doing X? Assuredly not, for this would mean that a belief of 
God's would be false. Is it possible, then, that Jones can bring it about that the 
past does not contain that belief of God's? This also is impossible, for it would 
involve changing the past. But how then can Jones have the power to refrain? 
The answer is that Plantinga, like Mavrodes, is using 'power' in a general sense 
here, the sense in which I use it when I say that I have the power to converse 
in Romanian, though my exercise of that power may sometimes be precluded 
by the absence of other speakers of that language. Similarly, Jones has the power 
to refrain from doing X, and no doubt does so on many occasions (a life of 
continual X-ing would probably be pretty monotonous!), but his refraining there-
from on this occasion is precluded by God's belief that at T 2 he will in fact do X. 
And what is true of Mavrodes and Plantinga will, I believe, tum out to be 
true of other compatibilists as well. When their positions are analyzed as far as 
they can be, it will tum out that either they affirm our ability to alter the past 
(and I know of none that does affirm this), or they speak of our "powers" in the 
soft determinist sense, the sense such that it may be in my power to do something 
even though precluding circumstances make it impossible that I should actually 
do it. 
Let me reinforce this by pointing out that the compatibilist position very clearly 
is a variety of determinism according to some quite standard definitions of 
determinism. According to Richard Taylor, for instance, 
Determinism is the general philosophical thesis which states that for 
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everything that ever happens there are conditions such that, given them, 
nothing else could happen. 37 
And Brand Blanshard says 
By indeterminism I mean the view that there is some event B that is 
not so connected with any previous event A that, givenA, B must occur. 38 
It is quite clear that, in the light of these definitions, the views of compatibilists 
such as Mavrodes and Plantinga qualify as a version of determinism rather than 
indeterminism. Of course, they may want to say that these are not the right 
definitions of determinism and indeterminism. But if so it is up to them to tell 
us what the right definitions are, and why we should prefer them to those given 
by Taylor and Blanshard. 
VII. Conclusion 
We have examined some arguments for the incompatibility of free will and 
comprehensive divine foreknowledge, and rejected some ineffective replies to 
those arguments. We have seen how theists who affirm this incompatibility deal 
with the resulting theological problem. We then considered the distinction 
between "hard facts" and "soft facts," and developed an analysis of that distinction 
according to which "God believed that P" will be a hard fact even if "P" is a 
proposition concerning the future. We then examined the contention that our 
power over the past is counterfactual power rather than power to bring about 
the past, and we saw that this attempted distinction collapses--demonstrably so 
in the case of power over God's past beliefs, but probably in all other cases as 
well. Finally, we considered the most profound and fundamental challenge to 
the incompatibilist arguments-the challenge which rejects altogether the neces-
sity of the past. We saw that this rejection, when pressed to its conclusion, 
requires that we have the ability actually to alter God's past beliefs-to bring it 
about that whereas it has always been true that God has always believed a certain 
thing, it will now no longer be the case that God has always believed that thing. 
We also saw that compatibilists do not in fact affirm this. Instead, they use 
crucial terms like 'can' and 'power' in a way which in effect commits them to 
a soft determinist conception of free will. And so the incompatibilist analysis of 
the situation is strikingly confirmed: those who seek to maintain the compatibility 
of free will and foreknowledge are in the end forced to abandon, implicitly if 
not explicitly, the libertarian conception of freedom with which the discussion 
began. 
It was noted at the beginning of this essay that the controversy over free will 
and foreknowledge has failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion. It is my hope 
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that compatibilists who read the essay will find that their positions have been 
fairly represented, that their arguments have been addressed, and that relevant 
questions have been raised. If so, then perhaps we can proceed together in the 
task of answering those questions. 39 
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